Nicholas Vause and Carolin Pflueger
Recently, Pflueger, Siriwardane and Sunderam (2020) proposed a new measure of investor risk perceptions based on the cross-section of stock prices. Using that measure, they found that when risk perceptions are high, the forfeit of wanted of risky firms is upper and subsequently real investment and employment ripen in the United States. In this post, we show that similar relationships exist in the United Kingdom. In 2023 Q1, the UK measure fell to its lowest level since the outbreak of the Covid pandemic, indicating higher risk perceptions and potentially foreshadowing weaker economic activity. This indicator may be helpful for policymakers, as it could serve as a useful measure of risk perceptions relevant for future economic developments and monetary policy.
Introducing the price of volatile stocks as a measure of risk perceptions
Economists such as Keynes, Minsky and Kindleberger have highlighted the importance of investor risk perceptions in driving economic fluctuations. In such accounts: (i) a negative economic shock causes perceptions of risk to rise; (ii) investors then value the safety of government immuration and tuition risky firms a higher forfeit of capital; and (iii) firms invest less and employment and output decline.
Pflueger, Siriwardane and Sunderam (2020) introduce a new measure of risk perceptions, the price of volatile stocks (PVS), motivated by a stylised model of (i), (ii) and (iii). Most simply, PVS is specified as the difference between the stereotype typesetting to market ratio (ie the written value of a visitor relative to its market value) of low minus high-volatility stocks. Intuitively, when investors perceive increasingly risk: risk want is low, the price of volatile stocks falls, the typesetting to market ratio of these stocks rises relative to less-volatile stocks, and PVS is low. This matters for the real economy: as investors perceive increasingly risk, they require higher expected returns to supply wanted to risky firms, their investment falls and employment and output decline.
The PVS in the UK
We expand the wringer to the UK, up to and including 2023 Q1. To summate the PVS in the UK, we follow four steps. First, at each quarter-end, we collect typesetting to market ratios for all stocks in the FTSE All-Share index. Second, using daily data on probity prices for the previous two months, we compute the return volatility for these stocks. Third, we group stocks into quintiles based on their return volatilities. Fourth, we compute the PVS as the difference between the stereotype typesetting to market ratio of stocks in the lowest and highest-volatility quintiles.
Chart 1 shows the time series of the UK PVS since the start of 2000, from when the coverage of our data has been reasonably comprehensive. For comparison the US PVS is superimposed. The correlation between the two series is quite upper at 53%, suggesting that investor risk perceptions are driven by global factors to a significant degree, potentially resulting with a global financial trundling (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020)). It moreover shows that the UK PVS fell sharply in 2023 Q1 surrounded the financial turmoil in the US and Europe. It declined by 2.2 standard deviations (which ways that sharper falls occur in only 1.4% of quarters), reaching levels not seen since the outbreak of Covid in 2020 Q1.
Chart 1: The price of volatile stocks
The relationship between PVS and economic worriedness in the UK
To investigate how the PVS relates to economic activity, we estimate local projection regressions of the form:
where yt h denotes a variable related to economic worriedness at h quarters superiority of the current quarter (t), which is either (i) the investment ratio, specified as the ratio of gross stock-still wanted insemination to gross wanted stock net of depreciation; (ii) the output gap as unscientific by the Office for Budgetary Responsibility or (iii) the transpiration in the unemployment rate. In addition, RR denotes the real risk-free interest rate, which is an volitional suburbanite of economic worriedness that we tenancy for, and which is measured as the yield on two-year inflation-indexed gilts. All the variables on the right-hand side of the equation are standardised, so we can interpret their coefficients as the response of economic worriedness in h quarters’ time to a one-standard-deviation shock to the right-hand-side variable.
Chart 2 shows the unscientific responses of the investment ratio, output gap and unemployment rate to a one standard deviation positive shock to the PVS in the UK. The solid lines show the inside estimates and the shading shows 95% conviction bands. A positive shock ways that investor risk perceptions have decreased. This boosts the investment ratio and the output gap and leads to a fall in the unemployment rate, with peak effects 3–8 quarters without the shock. The magnitudes and timings of the unscientific responses are similar to those found in the US by Pflueger, Siriwardane and Sunderam (2020), suggesting that risk perceptions are similarly relevant for economic worriedness in the UK as in the US.
Chart 2: Unscientific responses of economic worriedness to a one standard deviation positive PVS shock in the UK
In light of these relationships, the 2.2 standard deviation subtract in the UK PVS in 2023 Q1 may foreshadow a tangible ripen in economic activity. While these predictions unmistakably come with significant uncertainty attached, point estimates based on the results whilom suggest a peak ripen in the investment ratio of 0.4 percentage points from its 2023 Q1 level of 3%, a peak ripen in the output gap of 1.2 percentage points and a peak increase in the unemployment rate of 0.5 percentage points.
Nicholas Vause works in the Bank’s Wanted Markets Division and Carolin Pflueger works at the University of Chicago.
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